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Numerous philosophers have recently tried to defend physicalism regard-
ing phenomenal consciousness against dualist intuitions, by explaining 
the existence of dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. 
David Papineau, for example, suggested that certain peculiar features 
of some of our concepts of phenomenal experiences (the so-called “phe-
nomenal concepts”) led us to commit what he called the “Antipathetic 
Fallacy”: they gave us the erroneous impression that phenomenal expe-
riences must be distinct from purely physical states (the “intuition of 
distinctness”), even though they are not. Papineau’s hypothesis has been 
accepted, though under other names and in different forms, by many 
physicalist philosophers. Pär Sundström has tried to argue against Pap-
ineau’s account of the intuition of distinctness by showing that it was 
subjected to counterexamples. However, Papineau managed to show that 
Sundström’s counterexamples were not compelling, and that they could 
be answered within his framework. In this paper, I want to draw inspi-
ration from Sundström, and to put forth some refi ned counterexamples 
to Papineau’s account, which cannot be answered in the same way as 
Sundström’s. My conclusion is that we cannot explain the intuition of 
distinctness as the result of a kind of “Antipathetic Fallacy”.
Keywords: Consciousness, dualism, physicalism, introspection, 
concepts, intuition.
Introduction
Many philosophers recognize that phenomenal consciousness seems 
to pose a metaphysical problem. On the one hand, we have various 
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reasons to suppose that physicalism is true. Physicalism is the thesis 
that phenomenal states are fully identical with physical states (broadly 
construed, as to include physically realized functional states), such as 
brain states. On the other hand, the identity of phenomenal states and 
physical states appears very counter-intuitive. This is rendered mani-
fest when we focus introspectively on one of our current experiences: 
how can this (say, this sensation of pain) be the same thing as some 
electrochemical activity that takes place in my brain? 
Some dualist philosophers have argued that this intuition, once 
elaborated and transformed into arguments, simply shows that phe-
nomenal states are really distinct from physical states. Others have 
tried to defend physicalism against this intuition, by giving an expla-
nation of this intuition in a purely physicalist framework. For example, 
they have tried to show that this intuition is a by-product of certain 
(purely physical) features of some of our concepts of phenomenal states 
–concepts of phenomenal states which are notably applied through in-
trospection, and which are called “phenomenal concepts”. 
One particular line of thought has emerged as especially popular: 
some philosophers, such as David Papineau (Papineau 1993, 2002, 
2007), have tried to explain this dualist intuition (which Papineau la-
belled the “intuition of distinctness”) as being the result of a peculiar 
feature of phenomenal concepts. These concepts, according to Papine-
au, display a “use/mention feature”: whenever a subject uses them, she 
tends to activate the very experience thought about via this concept, or 
at least a “faint copy” of this experience. For this reason, when we think 
about phenomenal experiences qua experiences, i.e. with phenomenal 
concepts, our thought has a distinctive feeling, which it has not when 
we think about the same states qua brain states, using purely physical 
concepts. We then succumb to a fallacy that Papineau calls the “Anti-
pathetic Fallacy”, when we infer that this phenomenological difference 
between the two thoughts indicates that the thing thought about with 
a phenomenal concept must be itself different from the thing thought 
about with a purely physical concept.
Pär Sundström (Sundström 2008) addressed an objection to this 
physicalist account of the intuition of distinctness. He tried to show, 
on the basis of an imaginary counterexample, that this account cannot 
be correct, as it makes false predictions. It predicts that an intuition of 
distinctness should arise in a case in which it obviously doesn’t. David 
Papineau answered this objection, by showing that it was possible to 
reinterpret Sundström’s counterexample in order to make it harmless 
for his own account. In this paper, I want to draw inspiration from 
Sundström. I will formulate new counterexamples, inspired by Sund-
ström’s, which I think cannot be answered in the same way. I will then 
use these counterexamples to make a case for the idea that we cannot 
explain the intuition of distinctness as resulting from the “Antipathetic 
Fallacy” described by Papineau.
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In a fi rst section, I will explain how, in Papineau’s theory, the anti-
pathetic fallacy is supposed to account for the existence of the intuition 
of distinctness in a physicalist framework. In a second section, I will 
expose Sundström’s criticism, as well as Papineau’s answer to this criti-
cism. In a third section, I will present two thought experiments, one of 
which is a clear counterexample to Papineau’s account but cannot be 
answered in the same way as Sundström’s objection. In a fourth section, 
I will present more thought experiments—with the aim of showing that 
the intuition of distinctness really has little to do with a hypothetical 
“use/mention” feature of phenomenal concepts. In a fi fth section, I will 
consider one possible response to my argument, and I will try to counter 
it. The sixth section will be devoted to concluding remarks
1. The antipathetic fallacy 
and the intuition of distinctness
Phenomenal states are states such that there is something it is like to 
be in these states. A headache, a visual sensation of red, an olfactory 
sensation of honeysuckle, are typical examples of phenomenal states. 
These states are said to be endowed with phenomenal properties, which 
are properties in virtue of which these states are such that there is 
something it is like to be in them, and which are properties that deter-
mine what it is like to be in these states. Being a visual sensation of red, 
for example, that we can also label “phenomenal redness”, is a typical 
example of a phenomenal property.
We have numerous reasons to think that these properties must be 
wholly identical with physical properties—broadly construed, as to in-
clude physically realized functional properties.1 However, we are often 
deeply puzzled when we focus on our phenomenal states, and when 
we then try to think that they are fully identical with physical states, 
merely endowed with physical properties. How can this (thought by 
focusing, say, on a current visual sensation of red) be the same thing as 
a certain electrochemical activity in my visual cortex? Many of us, even 
convinced physicalists, admit that it seems to be a mystery. It has been 
said that in this kind of situation we face an explanatory gap (Levine 
1983, 2001). David Papineau described this situation by saying that, in 
these cases, we encounter a strong intuition of distinctness (Papineau 
2002): the intuition that our phenomenal states are not identical with 
physical states,2 but truly are distinct from them. This explanatory gap 
1 These reasons have generally mostly to do with causal considerations (Levine 
2001: Chapter 1; Papineau 2002, Chapter 1). I won’t expound them here, as my goal 
is not to argue in favor of physicalism.
2 I take these two descriptions of the issue to be roughly equivalent. This is 
confi rmed by Levine’s own words: “Whether we think of [the explanatory gap] as 
an explanatory gap or a distinctness gap, the problem is really the same” (Levine 
2007: 148). Also see (Papineau 2011) for the idea that the explanatory gap has to be 
interpreted as constituted by the intuition of distinctness.
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(or intuition of distinctness) fuels, in one way or in another, many anti-
physicalists arguments regarding phenomenal consciousness (Chalm-
ers 1996; Jackson 1982; Kripke 1980).
Some physicalists have suggested that it is possible to defend physi-
calism against this intuition, and against the arguments that it sup-
ports, by providing an explanation of this intuition within a physical-
ist framework. This explanation is supposed to rely on certain special 
features of some of the concepts we use to think about our phenomenal 
experiences. These concepts are called “phenomenal concepts”, and 
they are the concepts we notably (but not only) use when we focus in-
trospectively on our phenomenal experiences. In this view, phenom-
enal states indeed seem distinct from physical states. However, this 
happens merely in virtue of some features of the way in which we think 
about phenomenal states—features which are themselves purely phys-
ical. And, from a metaphysical point of view, phenomenal states really 
are identical with physical states. This kind of defense of physicalism 
has been labelled the “Phenomenal Concept Strategy” (Stoljar 2005). 
Numerous versions of this Strategy have been developed in the recent 
years (Aydede and Güzeldere 2005; Balog 2012; Hill 1997; Levin 2007; 
Loar 1997; Papineau 2002; Sturgeon 1994; Tye 1999).
Many of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal Concept Strat-
egy have a common way to tackle the intuition of distinctness. They 
interpret it as a result of what David Papineau called the “Antipa-
thetic Fallacy” (Papineau 1993, 2002, 2011). According to Papineau 
indeed, the intuition of distinctness arises because of a special feature 
of phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts present a “use/mention 
feature”: each occurrence of a given phenomenal concept involves the 
instantiation of the phenomenal property (identical to a physical prop-
erty) this concept refers to, or at least of a property resembling it. This 
means that every time I think about a type of phenomenal experience 
using phenomenal concepts, I crucially activate a version of this experi-
ence, or at least what Papineau calls a “faint copy” of this experience. 
Phenomenal concepts, in this view, are peculiar because they make use 
of the property they mention.3
Why does this feature give rise to an intuition of distinctness? The 
explanation, according to Papineau, goes as follows. When we try to 
consider that a given phenomenal state (say, a visual experience of 
red) and a given physical state are identical, we make use of two dif-
ferent concepts. The fi rst of them, being a phenomenal concept, brings 
the instantiation of phenomenal redness whenever we use it, while the 
other does not. Therefore, the phenomenal way of thinking about this 
property has itself a distinctive “feeling”: it is like something to think 
about phenomenal redness with a phenomenal concept. On the other 
hand, there is no distinctive feeling when I think about one of my brain 
3 The details of this theory have changed over the years in Papineau’s work 
(Papineau 1993, 2002, 2007), but the general idea has remained the same.
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states using physical concepts. So, according to Papineau, “there is an 
intuitive sense in which exercises of material concepts ‘leave out’ the 
experience at issue. They ‘leave out’ […] the technicolour phenomenol-
ogy, in the sense that they don’t activate or involve these experiences” 
(Papineau 2002: 170). And this is where we commit what Papineau 
calls the “Antipathetic Fallacy”: we can’t help thinking that the fact 
that our physical conception “leaves out” something when compared 
with our phenomenal conception shows that these two conceptions sim-
ply are not about the same thing. This is why it seems to us that phe-
nomenal states and physical states are distinct; this is how we get the 
intuition of distinctness.
Although David Papineau has been an early and a forceful defender 
of this kind of explanation, he is not the only one who has proposed 
something in the vicinity. An explanation of this type can indeed be 
found in the work of numerous philosophers proponents of the Phe-
nomenal Concept Strategy. Brian Loar, one of the other main defend-
ers of this Strategy, writes:
A phenomenal concept exercised in the absence of the phenomenal quality it 
stands for often involves, not merely a recognitional disposition, but also an 
image. And so, as a psychological state in its own right, a phenomenal con-
cept—given its intimate connection with imaging—bears a phenomenologi-
cal affi nity to a phenomenal state that neither state bears to the entertain-
ing of a physical-theoretical concept. When we then bring phenomenal and 
physical-theoretical concepts together in our philosophical ruminations, 
those cognitive states are phenomenologically so different that the illusion 
may be created that their references must be different. (Loar 1997: 605)
Even if this feature is not the only feature that is supposed to account 
for the explanatory gap in Loar’s account, it still plays an important 
role. Besides, the Antipathetic Fallacy, though not by this name, also 
plays a role in Michael Tye’s and Katalin Balog’s theories of phenom-
enal concepts (Balog 2012: 30–31; Tye 1999: 712–713). For reasons of 
simplicity, I suggest to call the hypothesis according to which the An-
tipathetic Fallacy (or something roughly equivalent) explains the birth 
of the intuition of distinctness the “Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis”. 
I think that it is safe to say that this hypothesis constitutes one of 
the major lines of thought developed by proponents of the Phenomenal 
Concept Strategy in order to account for the explanatory gap in a physi-
calist framework.4
4 The other aspect that proponents of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy usually 
insist upon is the conceptual independence of phenomenal concepts and physical 
concepts, which cause an absence of conceptual derivation from physical truths to 
phenomenal truths. Papineau does not insist upon this trait in his theory, however, 
as he does not think that the explanatory gap is primarily a matter of lack of 
conceptual derivation (Papineau 2011). I tend to agree with him as well as with 
Joseph Levine (Levine 2001, 2007: 200) on this point, even though I won’t talk about 
it here.
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2. Sundström’s counterexample 
and Papineau’s response
The Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis has been subjected to many criti-
cisms. One of them, that I fi nd quite compelling because it does not 
bear on many theoretical assumptions, relies on counterexamples. It 
has been developed by Pär Sundström (Sundström 2008).
The general idea of Sundström’s criticism, as I understand it, can 
be exposed as follows. Let’s accept that, as the Antipathetic Fallacy Hy-
pothesis says, the use/mention feature of phenomenal concepts causes 
the intuition of distinctness.5 If this is the case, then we should expect 
that, whenever we consider an identity statement of a certain kind 
(which I will describe in detail), an intuition of distinctness arises.
The relevant identity statements are statements which relate two 
conceptions of the same phenomenal property (identical with a physical 
property, given that the hypothesis is physicalist), with only one con-
ception being systematically accompanied by the instantiation of this 
very phenomenal property. Let’s call statements of this kind “phenom-
enologically contrasted identity statements”. So, if the Antipathetic 
Fallacy Hypothesis is true, whenever we consider phenomenologically 
contrasted identity statements, we should have an intuition of distinct-
ness concerning the two things identifi ed in the statement.
Sundström then shows that there are cases that can intuitively 
count as counterexamples to this prediction: cases in which we do con-
sider phenomenologically contrasted identity statements and yet do not 
have an intuition of distinctness. Sundström puts forth two examples 
of this kind. The fi rst one essentially relies on some particular details 
of Papineau’s account of phenomenal concepts, and notably Papineau’s 
hypothesis that there are “derived” phenomenal concepts.6 The second 
counterexample seems to me to be more compelling, as it does not bear 
on any specifi cs of the targeted theory, and therefore could apply to any 
theory that tries to explain the intuition of distinctness in a similar 
5 Papineau seemed at fi rst to imply that the Antipathetic Fallacy was the only 
cause of the intuition of distinctness, but he later explicitly stated that it was likely 
to be just one cause of this intuition amongst others (Papineau 2011: 17–19).
6 Roughly: Papineau says that there are, aside from “full-blown” phenomenal 
concepts, derived phenomenal concepts (Papineau 2007: 127–128). They are mental 
representations that are informationally deeply connected to “genuine” phenomenal 
concepts, so that they can refer to the same property, but whose instantiations do not 
necessitate the instantiation of the phenomenal property referred to (these concepts 
are required in order for me to be able to think thoughts such that: “I am not having 
an experience of this kind right now”). Sundström then builds a counterexample to 
Papineau’s theory, crucially using these concepts. In a nutshell, his counterexample 
goes like this (Sundström 2008: 141): he notes that any identity statements relating 
a derived phenomenal concept and a genuine phenomenal concept will constitute 
what I called a phenomenologically contrasted identity statement, and then should 
cause an intuition of distinctness. However, according to him, this is obviously not 
the case.
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manner as Papineau’s—even one which is not committed to the exis-
tence of “derived” phenomenal concepts. For this reason, I will focus on 
this particular counterexample.7
The counterexample goes like this (Sundström 2008: 141–142). Con-
sider an identity statement such as “My brother’s most salient current 
experience = an experience of white”. Let’s say that the second half of 
the identity statement is thought while focusing on my current experi-
ence of the whiteness of the background of my Word document. On the 
other hand, if we consider the fi rst half of the identity statement, it 
seems that it can be thought without any instantiation of phenomenal 
whiteness. After all, I can think about my brother’s most salient current 
experience without having in mind a particular experience—even with-
out knowing what kind of experience it is. Therefore, this identity state-
ment is a phenomenologically contrasted identity statement. If the Anti-
pathetic Fallacy Hypothesis is true, an intuition of distinctness should 
arise. But, according to Sundström, it is obviously not the case. I have 
no trouble entertaining the hypothesis that my brother’s most salient 
current experience is an experience of white. I am in no way puzzled by 
this statement—while I am puzzled when I think that an experience of 
white is a certain neural activation in my sensory cortex. So, this coun-
terexample seems to show that the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis 
makes false predictions, and should therefore be abandoned.
Papineau later responded to this counterexample (Papineau 2011: 
16–17). Acknowledging that Sundström’s point is “well-taken”, he 
seemed to agree with most of the premises of Sundström’s objection. 
He notably seemed to accept that the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis 
predicts that, when we face a phenomenologically contrasted identity 
statement, an intuition of distinctness should arise. He also recognized 
that we do not face such an intuition when we consider the identity 
statement: “My brother’s most salient current experience = an experi-
ence of white”.
His defense strategy against Sundström’s objection amounted to 
arguing that this identity statement is not a phenomenologically con-
trasted identity statement after all. Maybe, he says, we “tend surrepti-
tiously to activate the experience” of white when we think the fi rst half 
of the identity statement. Or maybe we don’t activate the experience 
of white when we think the second half of the identity statement—for 
example, because we are making use of a derived phenomenal concept 
instead of a “genuine” phenomenal concept in order to think about the 
experience of white. We just have to stipulate that one of these two pos-
sibilities is the case in order for the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis to 
be protected against Sundström’s objection.
7 I also fi nd it more interesting to focus on this counterexample as it is the only 
one (to the best of my knowledge) which has received an explicit response from 
Papineau.
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Is this defense successful? I think that it can partially succeed, 
as one of the two possibilities described by Papineau could indeed be 
the case. It could be that, when I think about “My brother’s most sa-
lient current experience” (and then try to equate it to an experience 
of white), I “tend surreptitiously to activate” an experience of white. 
Nothing, in Sundström’s description of this situation, can guarantee 
that this is not the case. As for the other possibility, I don’t think (pace 
Papineau) that it constitutes a way out for the defender of the Antipa-
thetic Fallacy Hypothesis. Indeed, Sundström explicitly supposed that, 
when I thought the second half of the identity statement, I focused on 
my current experience of the whiteness of the background of my Word 
document. It couldn’t be the case then that my thinking is not accom-
panied by an experience of white.
However, one possibility is enough to protect the Antipathetic Fal-
lacy Hypothesis against Sundström’s counterexample. Therefore, I 
think that it allows Papineau to block Sundström’s objection.
My opinion is that Sundström’s point is mostly right, and that the 
Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis does not constitute a satisfying ex-
planation of the intuition of distinctness. My goal is to draw on Sund-
ström’s proposal and to propose some refi ned counterexamples, which 
do not allow for the same kind of defense move as the one suggested by 
Papineau. I will devote the rest of this paper to the description of these 
refi ned counterexamples.
3. A refi ned counterexample 
to the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis
Suppose that I am sitting on a couch with my sister Elise, facing a large 
TV screen. Both of us have our eyes open, and we are visually paying 
attention to the screen. A computer feeds the screen with images—
let’s say, for reasons of simplicity, that they are only images of colored 
geometrical shapes: a red triangle, a blue square, a green rectangle, 
etc. In my hand, I hold a remote control. Every time I press a button 
on the remote control, the image on the screen changes. The software 
that runs in the computer makes it so that the succession of images is 
“random”, in the sense that I have absolutely no way to predict what 
the next image will be.
I will now expose a few thought experiments which all use this de-
vice. Let’s start with a rather innocuous one. Suppose that I am trying 
to consider a kind of naïve version of representationalist physicalism 
concerning consciousness, which states that when I have a conscious 
experience of an object, this conscious experience is identical with the 
physical state of my brain when it detects this object. Say that I am try-
ing to decide if such a position is plausible while I am facing the screen—
which, at the time, displays an image of a blue square. So: while visually 
focusing on the square, I consider the identity “My experience of this 
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blue square = The state of my brain when it detects this blue square”. 
Let’s stipulate that I think the fi rst half of the identity statement by 
introspectively focusing on my experience of the blue square, and that, 
when I think the second half, I think the “blue square” component on 
the basis of my visual perception of it, by focusing on it. That means that 
the identity statement I am considering is not a phenomenologically 
contrasted identity statement. Indeed, my thinking of both halves of the 
identity statement crucially relies on me instantiating the phenomenal 
property associated with an experience of a blue square. But I take it 
that, in this case, I will still have a clear intuition of distinctness: I will 
be puzzled, as in any other case, by the fact that my experience could 
be identical with a certain state of my brain. I think that it shows that 
phenomenologically contrasted identity statements are not necessary 
for intuitions of distinctness to arise8, which in turn shows that the An-
tipathetic Fallacy, if it can be a cause that gives rise to such intuitions, 
clearly cannot be their only cause. This point, as noted previously, has 
been clearly recognized by Papineau himself in recent papers.
Let’s turn to a second thought experiment. Let’s say that, still fac-
ing the screen, I close my eyes, and then press the button of the remote 
control. I now know that a new image is being displayed on the screen, 
and I know that my sister is visually experiencing it. However, I have 
no idea what the image is. Now let’s say that, with my eyes still closed, 
I start thinking about “My sister Elise’s most salient current experi-
ence”. I assume that this experience is the experience that she is cur-
rently having as she watches the screen. However, given that I have 
my eyes closed, I have no idea what this experience is. This guarantees 
me that, when I think about Elise’s most salient current experience 
with my eyes closed, I am not (surreptitiously or not) activating an 
experience of the same kind.9 Let’s say that I now prepare myself to 
entertain the hypothesis that Elise’s most salient current experience, 
about which I am thinking with my eyes closed, is type-identical with 
the experience that I would myself get if I opened my eyes. I then con-
sider that Elise’s most salient current experience is identical with… 
(and here I open my eyes) an experience of a purple hexagon (where this 
part is thought with a phenomenal concept, and while focusing on the 
very experience I got as soon as I opened my eyes).
In this situation, do I have an intuition of distinctness? I take it to 
be obvious that I don’t. Of course Elise’s experience can be an experi-
ence of a purple hexagon. Of course she can be in a state that feels like 
8 Sundström also put forth a thought experiment aiming at showing that, though 
it relied on the details of Papineau’s account regarding derived phenomenal concepts 
(Sundström 2008: 141).
9 Except if (1) I am imagining what this experience could be and, by chance, I just 
got it right—but this would happen only very rarely; or (2) We suppose that I am able 
to activate together and at the same time hundreds of different visual experiences (of 
a blue square, of a red diamond, of a yellow star, all in different sizes and hues, etc.). 
I take this to be completely implausible.
68 F. Kammerer, Is the Antipathetic Fallacy Responsible for the Intuition
this. But here is the point: the identity statement I was considering 
was a phenomenologically contrasted identity statement, and it seems 
very diffi cult to deny it. Indeed, I forced myself to think about Elise’s 
current experience without any possibility of knowing what this experi-
ence was, so that I was obviously not activating a copy of this experi-
ence (even “surreptitiously”). That guarantees that the fi rst half of the 
identity statement was thought about without activating an experience 
of a purple hexagon. And then I forced myself to think about the experi-
ence of a purple hexagon by introspectively focusing on the very experi-
ence I got when I opened my eyes—which guarantees that, this time, 
I instantiated the corresponding phenomenal property when I thought 
about the experience.
So, in the situation described in the thought experiment, I consider 
a statement, which is quite certainly a phenomenologically contrasted 
identity statement, and I nonetheless get no intuition of distinctness. 
This case therefore constitutes a counterexample to the Antipathetic 
Fallacy Hypothesis, which draws inspiration from Sundström’s case 
but cannot be answered in the same way.
4. Pulling apart the intuition of distinctness and 
the phenomenologically contrasted identity statements
I have shown previously, in my fi rst thought experiment, that phenom-
enologically contrasted identity statements are not necessary for an 
intuition of distinctness to arise. This is something Papineau himself 
recognized. I then presented a thought experiment that gives a reason 
to think that they are not suffi cient for an intuition of distinctness. I 
tend to think that this shows that we should pull apart the issue of in-
tuitions of distinctness, and the issue of phenomenologically contrasted 
statements. I now want to quickly present a few more thought experi-
ments that could bring our intuition in the same direction.
Suppose that I am still facing the same screen, with my sister Elise 
still by my side. I then close my eyes and press the button of the remote 
control. At this point I know that my sister is looking at an image, but 
I don’t know which image it is. Let’s say that, my eyes closed, I start 
thinking about “the current state of Elise’s visual cortex”. I then decide 
to consider the fact that it is identical with… (and then I open my eyes) 
the state of Elise’s visual cortex when she looks at this—where this is, 
say, a red oval, about which I think on the basis of my visual perception 
of it. Do I then have an intuition of distinctness? I take it to be obvi-
ous that I don’t: the identity I am considering seems perfectly reason-
able. Of course the current state of her cortex can be identical with a 
certain state of her cortex! But the identity statement I was trying to 
consider at the time was nonetheless a phenomenologically contrasted 
identity statement. This also shows that the phenomenological con-
trast between two conceptions is not suffi cient to create an intuition of 
distinctness concerning the two objects referred to by the conceptions.
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Now, let’s consider one more thought experiments in which an in-
tuition of distinctness does arise while I consider a phenomenologically 
contrasted identity statement, but in such a way that it does not fi t 
well with the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis. Let’s say that, while I 
am in the same kind of situation as described previously, I think, with 
my eyes closed, about Elise’s most salient current experience. Again, I 
have no idea what it is at the time. I then consider that this experience 
is identical with… (and then I open my eyes) the state of Elise’s visual 
cortex when she looks at this—where this is, say, a blue spiral, about 
which I think on the basis of my visual perception of it.
I take it that, in that case, an intuition of distinctness would arise: 
how could Elise’s experience be identical with a state of her cortex? This 
identity statement would seem as strange as any other physico-phe-
nomenal identity statement. I may believe it, but I will fi nd it puzzling 
nonetheless. In that case, the identity statement I consider happens to 
be a phenomenologically contrasted identity statement. However, we 
can see here that the phenomenologically loaded conception, which is 
in the second half of the identity statement, is not at all the conception 
that seems to refer to an irreducibly phenomenal entity. In fact, that 
is exactly the contrary. The intuition of distinctness arises, but what 
strikes me as being irreducibly phenomenal is the thing thought about 
in a non-phenomenologically loaded way: eyes closed, and while not 
knowing what kind of experience is thought about.
Our previous examples had shown that phenomenologically con-
trasted identity statements were not necessary, nor suffi cient, for intu-
itions of distinctness to arise. The further examples I just put forth are 
cases in which the two relevant factors (the intuitions of distinctness in 
the one hand, the phenomenologically contrasted identity statements 
on the other hand) can vary quite independently from each other. I hope 
they will incite the reader to completely pull apart these two things. An 
intuition of distinctness can arise, whether or not we are considering 
a phenomenologically contrasted identity statement, and I don’t think 
that we have solid reasons to believe that one causes the other.
I don’t intend to assert here that the specifi c way in which we grasp 
our phenomenal experiences through introspection is not crucial when 
it comes to explaining the arising of the intuition of distinctness. I ac-
tually think that our introspective grasp of consciousness has special 
features, which explain this intuition. But the Antipathetic Fallacy hy-
pothesis, understood as one particular way to interpret in what way 
our introspective grasp of experiences contributes to the presence of 
this intuition, is mistaken. It is not true that we are reluctant to equate 
a phenomenal experience (thought about introspectively) with a purely 
physical state (thought about with purely physical concepts) because 
the fi rst thought activates the concerned experience (or a copy of this 
experience), while the other doesn’t.
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5. Objection: can we really separate 
two steps in our thinking of identity statements?
The counterexamples I just presented may be subject to objections. I 
would like to consider one of them, and then try to answer it.
In order for my counterexamples to be immune to the kind of an-
swer that Papineau gave to Sundström’s objection, I had to describe 
them in such a way that it is guaranteed that the identity statements 
considered are indeed phenomenologically contrasted identity state-
ments. This crucial task was fulfi lled thanks to some specifi c features 
of the situation described in the counterexamples.
It is especially crucial to the counterexamples that the fi rst half 
of the identity statements considered is always thought with the eyes 
closed (while ignoring the image displayed on the screen), and that the 
other half is thought with the eyes open, and on the basis of the visual 
perception I then get. But one could object the following: when we con-
sider an identity statement, our thought cannot be temporally divided 
in such a clear and cut way. Thought is not like speech, in this respect. 
In fact, whenever we consider an identity statement, we have to think 
the two conceptions of the two things that are being identifi ed at the 
same time, and thus bring together these two conceptions in our mind, 
so to speak. For this reason, when we look at the counterexamples I just 
described, there is no sense in saying that we only think the fi rst half 
of the identity “the eyes closed”, and without activating the relevant 
experience, because we also have to think it with the eyes open. Indeed, 
it is only when we have the eyes open that we can properly think the 
second half of the identity statement, and then “assemble” in our minds 
the fi rst half and the second half of the identity statement. Therefore, 
when we think the relevant identity statement, we must think even 
the fi rst half of the identity statement with our eyes open, visually at-
tending at the screen, which means that we must think it while hav-
ing the relevant experience. This means that the identity statements 
we are considering in the counterexamples are not phenomenologically 
contrasted identity statements after all. Therefore, they are not coun-
terexamples to the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis.
This objection has a certain appeal. However, I don’t think that a 
defender of the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis could make use of it 
in order to defend her theory against the counterexamples I put forth. 
Indeed, this objection crucially relies on the thesis that, when we think 
an identity statement, we have to activate at the same time the two 
conceptions (of the two things we try to identify) in order to “bring them 
together” in our mind. But this would destroy the very possibility of 
phenomenologically contrasted identity statements. For this would 
mean that, anytime I think a given identity statement, I have to enter-
tain the two conceptions thought about at the same time, which means 
that, at least at that moment, both conceptions would be accompanied 
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by whatever phenomenology accompanies the other. That means that I 
could never think an identity statement in such a way that my thinking 
of one part of the statement would be accompanied by a given phenom-
enology, while my thinking of the other part would not. But, if there are 
no such things as phenomenologically contrasted identity statements, 
then the explanans posited by the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis 
does not exist. Therefore, this hypothesis is false.
For this reason, even if this objection can seem appealing, I don’t 
think a defender of the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis can make use 
of it in order to repeal my counterexamples.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have devised thought experiments in order to show 
(conclusively, I hope) that phenomenologically contrasted identity 
statements are neither necessary, nor suffi cient, for intuitions of dis-
tinctness to arise. The counterexamples I designed to show that they 
are not suffi cient were inspired by Pär Sundström’s counterexample 
to Papineau’s theory. I tried to construct them in such a way that it 
was not possible to answer them in the same way Papineau answered 
Sundström’s. I also tried to put forth a variety of cases, in which these 
two features of the situations (whether or not the identity statements 
considered are phenomenologically contrasted, and whether or not 
they create an intuition of distinctness) vary independently. My goal 
was to incite the reader to pull apart these two features of the situa-
tion: the phenomenological contrast that can exist between two halves 
of an identity statement, and the birth of an intuition of distinctness 
vis-à-vis the two objects identifi ed in the statement.
In this paper, I argued against the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis, 
which is a hypothesis that aims at defending physicalism against the 
dualist intuition (the “intuition of distinctness”), by giving an explana-
tion of this intuition within a physicalist framework. However, I did 
not plan to argue against physicalism. I did not even plan to argue 
against the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, if we understand it as the 
general attempt to defend physicalism against dualist intuitions (such 
as the intuition of distinctness) by appealing to some physically ex-
plainable features of our way of thinking about conscious experience 
in order to explain the birth of this intuition. I therefore think that nu-
merous versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (Aydede and Gü-
zeldere 2005; Hill 1997; Levin 2007; Sturgeon 1994) are left untouched 
by my argument. My own point of view is that physicalism is true, and 
that we can account for the intuition of distinctness within a purely 
physicalist framework, by showing how this intuition arises as a conse-
quence of some of the features of our introspective grasp of conscious-
ness. However, as I tried to show, the Antipathetic Fallacy Hypothesis 
does not give us a satisfying explanation of this intuition. My own view, 
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for which I did not argue here, is that the only satisfying physicalist 
theory of our introspective grasp of consciousness is an illusionist one, 
according to which we introspectively represent ourselves as conscious 
even though consciousness does not really exist (Frankish 2016). Illu-
sionist views of consciousness escape the objection made here, as well 
as objections usually made against the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. 
Of course, they encounter problems of their own, whose solution may 
not be trivial (Kammerer 2018, 2016).
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